egttools.analytical.utils.StochDynamics¶
- class StochDynamics(nb_strategies, payoffs, pop_size, group_size=2, mu=0)[source]¶
Bases:
object
A class containing methods to calculate the stochastic evolutionary dynamics of a population.
Defines a class that contains methods to compute the stationary distribution for the limit of small mutation (only the monomorphic states) and the full transition matrix.
- Parameters:
nb_strategies (int) – number of strategies in the population
payoffs (npt.NDArray[np.float64][numpy.float64[m,m]]) –
Payoff matrix indicating the payoff of each strategy (rows) against each other (columns). When analyzing an N-player game (group_size > 2) the structure of the matrix is a bit more involved, and we can have 2 options for structuring the payoff matrix:
1) If we consider a simplified version of the system with a reduced Markov Chain which only contains the states at the edges of the simplex (the Small Mutation Limit - SML), then, we can assume that, at most, there will be 2 strategies in a group at any given moment. In this case, StochDynamics expects a square matrix of size nb_strategies x nb_strategies, in which each entry is a function that takes 2 positional arguments k and group_size, and an optional *args argument, and will return the expected payoff of the row strategy A in a group with k A strategists and group_size - k B strategists (the column strategy). For all the elements in the diagonal, only 1 strategy should be present in the group, thus, this function should always return the same value, i.e., the payoff of a row strategy when all individuals in the group adopt the same strategy. See below for an example.
2) If we want to consider the full Markov Chain composed of all possible states in the simplex, then the payoff matrix should be of the shape nb_strategies x nb_group_configurations, where the number of group configurations can be calculated using egttools.calculate_nb_states(group_size, nb_strategies). Moreover, the mapping between group configurations and integer indexes must be done using egttools.sample_simplex(index, group_size, nb_strategies). See below for an example
pop_size (int) – population size
group_size (int) – group size
mu (float) – mutation probability
See also
egttools.numerical.PairwiseComparisonNumerical
,egttools.analytical.replicator_equation
,egttools.analytical.PairwiseComparison
Notes
We recommend that instead of`StochDynamics`, you use PairwiseComparison because the latter is implemented in C++, runs faster and supports more precise types.
Examples
- Example of the payoff matrix for case 1) mu = 0:
>>> def get_payoff_a_vs_b(k, group_size, \*args): ... pre_computed_payoffs = [4, 5, 2, ..., 4] # the size of this list should be group_size + 1 ... return pre_computed_payoffs[k] >>> def get_payoff_b_vs_a(k, group_size, \*args): ... pre_computed_payoffs = [0, 2, 1, ..., 0] # the size of this list should be group_size + 1 ... return pre_computed_payoffs[k] >>> def get_payoff_a_vs_a(k, group_size, \*args): ... pre_computed_payoffs = [1, 1, 1, ..., 1] # the size of this list should be group_size + 1 ... return pre_computed_payoffs[k] >>> def get_payoff_b_vs_b(k, group_size, \*args): ... pre_computed_payoffs = [0, 0, 0, ..., 0] # the size of this list should be group_size + 1 ... return pre_computed_payoffs[k] >>> payoff_matrix = np.array([ ... [get_payoff_A_vs_A, get_payoff_A_vs_B], ... [get_payoff_B_vs_A, get_payoff_B_vs_B] ... ])
- Example of payoff matrix for case 2) full markov chain (mu > 0):
>>> import egttools >>> nb_group_combinations = egttools.calculate_nb_states(group_size, nb_strategies) >>> payoff_matrix = np.zeros(shape=(nb_strategies, nb_group_combinations)) >>> for group_configuration_index in range(nb_group_combinations): ... for strategy in range(nb_strategies): ... group_configuration = egttools.sample_simplex(group_configuration_index, group_size, nb_strategies) ... payoff_matrix[strategy, group_configuration_index] = get_payoff(strategy, group_configuration)
Methods
Returns the full transition matrix in sparse representation.
Calculates the stationary distribution of the monomorphic states is mu = 0 (SML).
The fermi function determines the probability that the first type imitates the second.
In a population of x i-strategists and (pop_size-x) j strategists, where players interact in group of 'group_size' participants this function returns the average payoff of strategies i and j.
Calculates the fitness of strategy i versus strategy j, in a population of x i-strategists and (pop_size-x) j strategists, considering a 2-player game.
Function for calculating the fixation_probability probability of the invader in a population of residents.
Calculate the fitness difference between strategies :param i and :param j assuming that player interacts in groups of size group_size > 2 (n-player games).
Calculates the fitness of strategy i in a population with state :param population_state, assuming pairwise interactions (2-player game).
Calculates the gradient of selection for an invading strategy, given a population state.
Calculates the gradient of selection for an invading strategy, given a population state.
Calculates the gradient of selection given an invader and a resident strategy.
This function calculates for a given number of invaders the probability that the number increases or decreases with one.
This function calculates for a given number of invaders the probability that the number increases or decreases with taking into account a mutation rate.
Calculates the transition matrix (only for the monomorphic states) and the fixation_probability probabilities.
Updates the groups size of the game (and the methods used to compute the fitness)
Updates the payoff matrix
Updates the size of the population and the number of possible population states.
- calculate_full_transition_matrix(beta, *args)[source]¶
Returns the full transition matrix in sparse representation.
- Parameters:
- Returns:
The full transition matrix between the two strategies in sparse format.
- Return type:
- calculate_stationary_distribution(beta, *args)[source]¶
Calculates the stationary distribution of the monomorphic states is mu = 0 (SML). Otherwise, it calculates the stationary distribution including all possible population states.
This function is recommended only for Hermitian transition matrices.
- static fermi(beta, fitness_diff)[source]¶
The fermi function determines the probability that the first type imitates the second.
- fitness_group(x, i, j, *args)[source]¶
In a population of x i-strategists and (pop_size-x) j strategists, where players interact in group of ‘group_size’ participants this function returns the average payoff of strategies i and j. This function expects that
\[x \in [1,pop_size-1]\]- Parameters:
- Return type:
- Returns:
float Returns the difference in fitness between strategy i and j
- fitness_pair(x, i, j, *args)[source]¶
Calculates the fitness of strategy i versus strategy j, in a population of x i-strategists and (pop_size-x) j strategists, considering a 2-player game.
- fixation_probability(invader, resident, beta, *args)[source]¶
Function for calculating the fixation_probability probability of the invader in a population of residents.
TODO: Requires more testing!
- Parameters:
- Returns:
The fixation_probability probability.
- Return type:
- full_fitness_difference_group(i, j, population_state)[source]¶
Calculate the fitness difference between strategies :param i and :param j assuming that player interacts in groups of size group_size > 2 (n-player games).
- Parameters:
- Return type:
- Returns:
float
The fitness difference between strategies i and j
- full_fitness_difference_pairwise(i, j, population_state)[source]¶
Calculates the fitness of strategy i in a population with state :param population_state, assuming pairwise interactions (2-player game).
- Parameters:
- Return type:
- Returns:
float
The fitness difference between the two strategies for the given population state
- full_gradient_selection(population_state, beta)[source]¶
Calculates the gradient of selection for an invading strategy, given a population state.
- Parameters:
population_state (npt.NDArray[np.float64][np.int64[m,1]]) – structure of unsigned integers containing the counts of each strategy in the population
beta (float) – intensity of selection
- Returns:
Matrix indicating the likelihood of change in the population given a starting point.
- Return type:
npt.NDArray[np.float64][numpy.float64[m,m]]
- full_gradient_selection_without_mutation(population_state, beta)[source]¶
Calculates the gradient of selection for an invading strategy, given a population state. It does not take into account mutation.
- Parameters:
population_state (npt.NDArray[np.float64][np.int64[m,1]]) – structure of unsigned integers containing the counts of each strategy in the population
beta (float) – intensity of selection
- Returns:
Matrix indicating the likelihood of change in the population given a starting point.
- Return type:
npt.NDArray[np.float64][numpy.float64[m,m]]
- gradient_selection(k, invader, resident, beta, *args)[source]¶
Calculates the gradient of selection given an invader and a resident strategy.
- Parameters:
k (int) – number of invaders in the population
invader (int) – index of the invading strategy
resident (int) – index of the resident strategy
beta (float) – intensity of selection
args (Optional[List]) – other arguments. Can be used to pass extra arguments to functions contained in the payoff matrix.
- Returns:
The gradient of selection.
- Return type:
- prob_increase_decrease(k, invader, resident, beta, *args)[source]¶
This function calculates for a given number of invaders the probability that the number increases or decreases with one.
- Parameters:
k (int) – number of invaders in the population
invader (int) – index of the invading strategy
resident (int) – index of the resident strategy
beta (float) – intensity of selection
args (Optional[list]) – other arguments. Can be used to pass extra arguments to functions contained in the payoff matrix.
- Returns:
tuple(probability of increasing the number of invaders, probability of decreasing)
- Return type:
Tuple[numpy.typing.ArrayLike, numpy.typing.ArrayLike]
- prob_increase_decrease_with_mutation(k, invader, resident, beta, *args)[source]¶
This function calculates for a given number of invaders the probability that the number increases or decreases with taking into account a mutation rate.
- Parameters:
k (int) – number of invaders in the population
invader (int) – index of the invading strategy
resident (int) – index of the resident strategy
beta (float) – intensity of selection
args (Optional[list]) – other arguments. Can be used to pass extra arguments to functions contained in the payoff matrix.
- Returns:
tuple(probability of increasing the number of invaders, probability of decreasing)
- Return type:
- transition_and_fixation_matrix(beta, *args)[source]¶
Calculates the transition matrix (only for the monomorphic states) and the fixation_probability probabilities.
This method calculates the transitions between monomorphic states. Thus, it assumes that we are in the small mutation limit (SML) of the moran process. Only use this method if this assumption is reasonable.
- Parameters:
- Returns:
This method returns a tuple with the transition matrix as first element, and the matrix of fixation probabilities.
- Return type:
Tuple[npt.NDArray[np.float64][numpy.float64[m,m]], npt.NDArray[np.float64][numpy.float64[m,m]]]
- update_group_size(group_size)[source]¶
Updates the groups size of the game (and the methods used to compute the fitness)
- Parameters:
group_size (new group size)
- Return type:
- update_payoffs(payoffs, nb_strategies=None)[source]¶
Updates the payoff matrix
- Parameters:
payoffs (payoff matrix)
nb_strategies (total number of strategies (optional). If not indicated, then the new payoff) – matrix must have the same dimensions as the previous one
- Return type:
- update_population_size(pop_size)[source]¶
Updates the size of the population and the number of possible population states.
- Parameters:
pop_size (New population size)
- Return type:
- __annotations__ = {}¶